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Some Recent Theories of a Finite God,
Introduction.
Statement of The topic for discussion in this thesis
Subject and its
Delimitation. is to be "Some Recent Theories of a Finite God."
We will not enter into a survey of historic conceptions of God
for that is a vast field in itself. However, it v/ill be neces-
sary to state briefly two current theories of an infinite God
in order that we may understand what we are limiting. The
primary purpose of this thesis will not be to prove" the exist-
ence of God, as the thesis that there is a spiritual reality of
some sort which we call "God" is presupposed. My purpose is
to discover what some twentieth century writers believe about
God, and in the light of their ideas I shall present my own
theory. Since it is quite generally agreed that there may be,
and undoubtedly is, knov/ledge which no one has yet discovered,
we do not claim final authority for any of these theories.
Each theory is one man's attempt to explain reality in the
light of all truth. But, as each of these men sees his reality
a little differently, I dare to presume that I, too, have a right
to think just a little differently. My desire is to interpret
each man as nearly as possible as he himself believes. Having
done this I reserve the right to present my criticism of his
belief.
ec
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Reasons for the My reasons for choosing the sub-
Choice of Subject.
ject, "Some Recent Theories of a Finite
God", were essentially personal. I had been having trouble
with my own idea of God. I grew up believing that God was
all-pov/erful and all-good. But as I realized the slow pro-
gress of goodj the seeming victory of evil in the face of hon-
est effort toward good and implicit faith that God would lead;
and as I saw suffering on the part of those who had done nothing
to bring it about, I was forced to question. With Job I
refused to give up the goodness of God. Yet I saw no other
way unless God became a mere puppet in the hands of the uni-
verse. Therefore, I turned to those who, in recent years,
have faced the same problem, to see if their solutions would
help me. I have not fully accepted any one theory. But the
study has cleared my thinking and lifted me out of the vicious
state I had been in where I gave God one of three alternatives.
I was convinced that he was not both all-powerful and all-good.
Then he must be (l) all-powerful and not good (which I could
not believe); or (2) he was good but caught in the clutches
of a ruthless universe which he could not control (also not
satisfactory); or else (3) he did not exist at all. I was
almost ready to believe the last. Then, as I read • X came
to see that there are other v/ays out of the dilemma. The
way that I have chosen I shall describe later. But I have
put this study into a thesis because I believe that a study
which has helped me may also help others, even though they do
not come to my conclusions.
f0-
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Definition Before presenting any theories it is
of Terms
.
necessary to know just what we mean by the
different terms. Webster defines "infinite" as "without
limit in power, capacity, knowledge, or excellence; boundless;
immeasurably or inconceivably great; all-embracing; perfect,"''
In this study we shall consider the infinite not in terms of
the Absolute, but as possessing no limitation save self lim-
itation. In all of the theories of a finite God we find
God limited not only by his ovra nature, but by something out-
side of himself.
Statements of In my statements concerning the infinite
the Infinite.
A. Joyce. I have been very brief for that is merely back-
ground. I liave taken two theories of an infinite God for this
purpose. Joyce, a modern scholastic, sees God as first cause
who has created all else; that is, the universe exists only
through God, but he could and did exist without the Universe.
Having created the universe God is not limited by it. Thus, as
well as being first cause God is infinite, and if infinite, i.e.
according to Joyce, embracing all being, then timeless and im-
mutable. As the unmoved Mover, the Infinite Creator of the
finite, God is seen to have all the qualities of perfection which
are found in his universe. But these equalities are so infinite-
ly perfect in him as compared with their finite imperfection
that they can scarcely be considered as the same at all. Though
our finiteness makes it impossible to conceive of God in any but
finite terms, we must always be aware of the limitations of our
finite concepts. «
tf
"The Divine attributes, many though they he, all signify one
and the same Supreme Perfection in whom there is no distinc-
tion; hut by reason of the infinity of that Perfection, the
human mind can only represent it under a diversity of aspects
and by means of concepts differing from one another." *
The infinite, self-existent Being is clearly omnipotent.
Joyce defines omnipotence as power to do anything not self-
contradictory. Anything self-contradictory would be meaning-
less and could not limit the infinite in any true sense. The
matter of reconciling this omnipotent, perfect Being with evil
becomes a problem.
Joyce accounts for physical evil on the basis of our lim-
ited understanding of God's purposes and means of attaining
his ends. Spiritual evil or sin is due to God»s gift of human
free-will. However, this Prime Knower and Mover knov/s in ad-
vance each act of his free-agent creations and these acts can-
not take place unless he permits them. There thus arises the
problem of how we can have free will and still be limited by
what God permits, unless God permits anything we choose. And
if he permits it, is he not accountable for it? That God may
not be non-moral Joyce says, "In the case of God's CEeated
agents choosing vrrong he can use that choice to bring about
some good result." We simply have to believe that "all this
apparent frustration has its place in a providential scheme."
Joyce, G.H.; "Natural Theology" p. 246-7
Ibid. p. 394.
rf
5Thus Joyce presents to us a God infinite, eternal, unchang-
ing, omnipotent, and still somehow moral, but not very in-
timately personal.
Statements of Alexander, too, claims infinity for God,
the Infinite.
B. Alexander. but it is the infinitude of a boundless ideal.
God is not creator. Our conception of deity is variable, but
deity itself is not. On any level of existence deity is the
next step higher. It is something which we can experience,
but not wholly appreciate because it is higher than we are.
But this growing conception of deity is not God. The reality
is always the same and only our conceptions change. The uni-
verse is real, existing in space-time. Deity is, for any
level, the ideal just ahead. God is "the universe as tending
toward deity."* God is not mere spirit. The body of God, his
past content, is the whole growing iiniverse, and his mind is
deity, the step ahead. His body and mind are both infinite.
Alexander does not believe in a personal God. "God's divinity
is not a higher humanity, but something different in kind."^
Omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, eternity are simply finite
terms seeking to express the infinite. God as the "whole uni-
verse with a nisus to deity," "^^^ becomes a sort of objectified
ideal. It is not an attainment, but a possibility. When the
ideal is attained it ceases to be infinite. But this ideal is
more real than the actual becoming. Since he is not the creat-
or, evil is not God's creation, but as a fact of the universe it
does become a part of God with which He must contend and which
He must try to transform into good.
* Alexander-Space^ Time and Deity. Vol.l-p,361.
Ibid. p. 383.
ft
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6Since God is not personal we need not worry about his moral-
ity, simply about his purpose. Alexander's God, does not seem
to me pure pantheism because He is more than the universe,
the universe ever moving to something higher. God is infinite,
but Space-Time is the ultimate reality. It is not clear to me
just how Alexander reconciles this seeming paradox, but that
is his position.
Thus we find God the infinite personal creator who has
granted free v/ill and yet is neither limited by it nor rendered
non-moral by evil, and God as the infinite creatui*e, who is not
the creator nor the universe itself, but a sort of objectified
ideal always a step ahead of any level we may reach and there-
fore always drawing us onward.
Order of As I consider the finite conceptions, I
Procedure.
find that McConnell and Rashdall follow a logic
similar to Joyce's. But the other theories which I shall
present have more in common Yilth Alexander's reasoning. My
choice of order has been more or less arbitrary, but I have tried
to present the theories in the order in which they move from the
infinite and become more and more finite. Since I hardly
know W'here to classify Mr. Well's conception I have put him last.
My choice of the men whose ideas I shall present has been
frankly arbitrary. I have sought to present varied viev/s.
To do this I have chosen from among the men v/ho have been
brought to my attention on the basis of their philosophical
position and the availability of material on my subject.

Chapter I
McConnell»s Theory—The Christlike God.
Of all the theories which I shall consider Mr. McConnell's
comes nearest to that of modern scholasticism. He himself is
not willing to call his God finite.^- Yet the idea of a li^i-
ited infinite is contradictory. We said that the infinite was
bound only by self-limitation. McConnell admits that God is
limited by man's free will, but since man is God*s creation,
I suppose he considers man a self-limitation. Hov/ever, I agree
with Rashdall that, after He has created other persons, those
persons are objective to God, and as they lim-it him he becomes
finite. However, because he is so close to Joyce in his point
of view we v/ill consider him first.
God is The first fiindamental fact about God, accord-
Personal.
ing to McConnell, is that he is a moral person.
Jesus is the supreme creation of the world. It is impossible
to account for him by an impersonal universe. Many people
give up a personal God rather than make Him responsible for
evil, thus involving him in moral difficulties. But McConnell
contends that "the concrete and personal are morally more worthy
than the abstract and impersonal. He says it is not so hard
to account for evil on the basis of a personal God as it is to
accoTont for good, personal good, without a personal God.
* McConnell, F.J.; "Is God Limited?" pp. 106-9. He dis-
cusses and condemns the pluralist conception of a finite
God.
McConnell, F.J.j "The Christlike God." p. 49.

"The essential Christian belief Is that God is like unto
Christ."* All of the characteristics applied to God must
thus be judged on whether or not they could belong to a
moral being such as Christ v/as. When vie thus apply person-
ality to God, however, we are not giving him an anthropo-
morphic body. "\7hen we speak of a personal God we mean self-
consciousness and self-direction."^ "Christianity is more con
cerned with the absolutely moral God than v/lth metaphysical
absolutism." -^^^
God is This personal God is the Creator, "The uni-
Creator.
verse of matter is God*s continuous deed," -^HJ-jf-)?- and
being so, it cannot be bigger, stronger, wiser, nor better
than he is. In the light of modern science, matter is "in-
visible centers of force reporting themselves to us spatially...
For the thelst the forces are the continuously put forth en-
ergies of God... It follows that, so far as the world of mat-
ter is concerned, apart from any question as to human free-
dom, there is no way of freeing God from responsibility for
physical evil." -JHHHf Hov/ God can thus be held responsible and
still be good will be considered later. Suffice it here to
say that God has made his universe according to certain laws
and is now limited by them. If God were apt at any moment to
break all laws and do as he pleased all sense of security in
the imiverse would be lost. "If self-realization in an unlim-
ited Doer leads to a crazy imlverse, we forthwith seek for a
limited God... If we are to think of a Divine Being at all, we
must think of him as under some sort of limitation." -JHhhhj-
* McConnell; Op. Clt. p. 55.
** McConnell; "Is God Limited?" p. 243.
Ibid. p. 17.
^-5HH(- Ibid. P. 58.
*^5HHf Ibid. p. 20.
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Yet we must not, therefore, consider God as tied up in a bag
of his bwn making which he himself tied. He did not make the
world and its laws and then discover that things got beyond
him so that the only way to redeem the world was to set aside
law occasionally and act for himself, "The possibility of
miracle as departure from the accustomed method is hardly open
to doubt by believers in the God of Christianity, The actual-
ity of miracle, as the seizin-e of the higher powers of nature
by the higher spiritual personalities, is likewise not open to
serious doubt." * God is thus limited but not fettered by his
universe.
But God is not only the creator of the universe but of human
beings with the possibility of free will; that is, with "the
power to choose among physical forces already existing, the
humen choice being simply the occasion on which one energy or
another, already existing or potential is directed into one
channel or another." "There is no use in talking about the
Christlikeness of God unless God has and can bestow freedom...
Freedom is a gift from God and the giver of the gift shares
v.'ith the receivers the conseo^uences of the gift." -J^-"^- Human free
agents may act in a way wMch God would not choose, but God is
indirectly responsible because he created the beings v/ith this
possibility. Thus God is not only responsible for the evil in
the physical universe, but in the realm of human free V/'ill,
Otherv/ise God is not mcral. An intelligent being who created
a v;orld of human beings without counting the cost (in terms of
evil choices) would not be Christlike.
* McConnell, "The Christlike God" p. 171.
^ Ibid. p. 156.
^ Ibid. pp. 159-61.
(
"The risks involved in the creation of a human race (with free
will to choose between or among laws) we have no meens of know
ing, but we do not believe that can be assumed without know-
ledge enough and power enough and love enough, to prevent dis-
aster, if God is to be like Christ." ^-
Knowledge The knowledge of a moral God now becomes im-
of God
portant. McConnell says that God»s knowledge is
full and complete. He must know himself and his universe.
"God acts in the full light of wisdom—his act the full ex-
pression of intelligence, his act a unified whole. This
"full knowledge of the Divine must rise out of the full mor-
al lifte." McConnell admits of only two limitations to God*
knowledge. He cannot know evil in the sense of having shared
in it, but he can and must know sympathy fi6r the soul v/ho has
experienced evil. The other limitation of God»s lies in man*
free will. God, being the creator of laws, knows v;hat man's
choices are limited to, but v/e can easily admit that God does
not know in advance which choice a man will make. Even this
limitation of knoT/ledge is questionable as God may knov/, from
his knowledge of the man's nature and the choices which lie be
fore him, which way he will choose, v/ithout himself condition-
ing that choice.
Power "The theists have held fast to divine benev-
of God
olence, mostly at the cost of divine omnipotence,
though their surrenders have not been considerable."
* McConnell; Op. Cit. p. 163.
^ Ibid. p. 107.
^"-^ Ibid. p. 109.
*^HHf Ibid. p. 87.
c
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That is to say, if the goodness of God demands that he allow
men to choose rather than that he dictate their acts to them,
mankind will choose goodness rather than iinlimited power. If
man must choose between a God v/ith a power to ciiange the universe
at his slightest whim, and a £;ood God who is bound to be consist-
ent, he will choose the latter. "We can see that God aan do
all things except those which his ovm rational and moral char-
acter makes impossible, and those which are turned over to the
sphere of the freedom of a free man^s choice, the human free-
dom itself being the grant of the Creator and moving within a
range of activities where the will of God must necessarily be
a cooperating factor." God»s creatorship holds him respons-
ible even i*]ere his power is limited, f^ a wise and moral being
would not create a thing the moral consequences of which he
could not see. "All we can ask is that in those phases of
activity which we cannot understand, God acts not out of wan-
tonness or sportiveness, but out of a nature rational and m.oral
throughout." -w-^
Love of God loves men enough to suffer over their
God
sins. We cannot excape from this if we are to
H) think of God as Christlike. Love which can be most deeply
grieved by the shortcomings of the one or ones beloved is indeed
great love. "^^^
Unity and Absolute metaphysical unity v»ould demand
fl| Unchangeableness
that there be no free souls save the one.
But McConnell believes that it is better to have a conception of
God which lacks metaphysical unity than to keep metaphysical
ilcConnell, Op. Cit. p. 120.
McConnell, "The Christlike God." p. 102.
McConnell, "Is God Limited?" ch. XXIII.
rr
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unity at the cost of moral unity, "Such a loss of meta-
physical unity as the free creation of finite wills involves,
we shall have to yield to if we are to preserve the moral
unity of the divine Better have God struggling to get evil
out of men's lives than struggling to get it out of his own."
As God must be morally one so he must be morally unchang-
ing. This does not mean that God does not know change.
"Changes Tfhich men know have a mighty meaning for God." -^"^ The
main call for unchangeableness is moral, a fixity of moral
purpose. "I think we do not get help from a morally develop-
ing God, but a God whose own life is forever at the full might
well order the changes in the system in which Yie live." -^^^
Yet this very sameness of moral purposes calls for a difference
in the w^ God treats men. If he gave exactly the same treat-
ment to all men under all conditions he v^ould be metaphysically
immutable, perhaps, but he could not be said to have a moral
purpose at all. "It seems to me possible to believe in a
God above change, so far as his own moral development is con-
cerned, and who yet knows what change means for men." ^hhh?-
Immeanence We have stated in an earlier section that
and
Transcendence the universe is "God»s continuous deed,"
of God
If God had created the world and then left it to run as it
wished, he would have tiansferred his responsibility end thus
not be moral. If he is moral then he is immanent in his creation,
in everything except that he does not himself v^ill the choices
of free men. "The avowal that God is in a manner in all things
* McConnell; "The Christlike God." ou. 68-69.
Ibid. p. 81.
Ibid. p. 88.
Xb\<J'. p.
c
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may be accompanied by a frank profession of ignorance as to
how he is in this or that particular fact." * God is causal-
ly in all things alike, but when v/e come to meaning we find
^ much more of God in some things than in others. For example,
"God is in Christ as he is not elsev/here—as revelation of
spirit and character."** Again, to say that God is in all
things is not to say that everything is as God would have it
be. "God is v/orking everywhere for redemption among men who
have made wrong choices."
This brings us to the link whereby God is also trans-
cendent, God is in all things yet beyond them. He is the
creator yet is not satisfied with his creation. We say that
he is limited by them yet he is greater than they. This
sounds paradoxical yet it is so. Lincoln ?/as a thoroughgoing
democrat yet at times he found it necessary to be an extreme
autocrat in order to save his ideal of democracy. So God is
in everything yet by his very morality rises above all that
he is in.
God, Freedom, We cannot get away from the presence of
and
Responsibility evil in the physical universe. If God is
creator ;ve must give him responsibility for this evil. Much
of this apparent evil is in the very nature of things and is a
part of natural law. Lav/ is a statement of the methods by
(|| which an agent acts. "Everywhere in our limited world the
ma.stery of lav/ and obedience to it are the path to the largest
Op. Cit. p. 142.
Ibid. p. 135.
Ibid. p. 139.
cc
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liberty. V/e are at least in line with our oim experience
in suggesting that God may find his liberty through the law
which expresses his wisdom." "We do not care for a
creator who shows his freedom from limitation by trying now
one plan and now another. V/e like to think of him as shut up
to the best plan. ... The best always binds the free chooser.
The most free of beings has no choice when confronted by the
best. Having chosen there is no relief from the necessity of
going on through. ... We assume that we are dealing with a
responsible God who will be satisfied only with the best and
then will carry the best through." ^ However, much that
we see leads us to v/onder that a powerful and good God would
be able to find no better way to attain his purpose. The
moral requirement is thgt the cost itself shall be justifiable.
"If we are to think of God as the Christian God, the launching
of a race of human beings was not a foolhardy outburst of
irresponsible good-humor, afterward confronting an insoluble
situation brought about by the misuse of freedom. That concept-
ion is not an honor to God ...The bearing of the cross ... is
not a last minute expedient, but an essential, inherent in the
divine putting forth of the powers that are to win men."
Whenever man^s wrong acts are the result of hereditary
or other influences v/hich he could not possibly help, the re-
sponsibility is not his, it rests upon the system that goes
back to God. But "the responsibility can best be lodged with
God if we sincerely think of him as Christlike." God»s re-
* McConnell, "The Christlike God", p. 169.
Ibid.
McConnell, "Is God Limited?" P. 78.
Ibid, pp. 65-66
ro
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sponsibilitv is to bring about good from his creation. But
he cannot do this by turning men, his free-agents, into pup-
pets. His powers in the development of men are those of
"education of mind and heart and will." It is thus that the
wise, powerful, and moral God will bring about his ends.
Critical McConnell has definitely limited God more
Appraisal
than Joyce has. He has given up metaphysical im-
mutability and God's fore-knowledge of man's free acts. But
the difference is more of spirit than of specific character-
istics which differ. God, as McConnell interprets him is know-
able, whereas Joyce's idea is more abstract to me.
My chief point of difference with McConnell, I believe,
lies in the field of God's power. For McConnell God knows
change only from the time point of view, but not from the point
of vievf of dvelopment in any line. He limits God's power
only by his creations, both physical and mental, I agree v;ith
McConnell that God's moral purpose is unchanging. But if we
are to attain v^hat McConnell believes to be God's purpose
—
the redemption of the world— I can see no way out save by in-
crease of God's power. Surely, if God could educate the mind
and heart and v/ill in a generation he would do so and not take
generations, and I cannot help believing that if God's power
had been as complete as his goodness, he could have made a
physical universe with less pain and suffering. He says that
as a perfectly free Being God, Vvhen confronted with the best
could not choose other than the best. But what hope is there
for perfection if the best is as full of evil as is the physical
universe? I like his insistence that God, who is Christlike,
rr
C
must be trusted to bring good out of evil. But I am not sat-
isfied to say that a responsible God can be trusted to account
for the Mississippi flood, if his po?;er when he created laws,
was unlimited. I must also believe that could he have arranged
a way to bring about his ideal for the world without such catas-
trophes he would have done so. It does not take away from,
but rather adds to, my conception of God's morality to believe
that his pov/er and knowledge of how to bring about his ideal
are growing. Without such a belief I can see a way out for
human sins, but not an end to suffering in the physical vvorld.
McConnell asks. Is not a v/ill activity forever at the full,
forever acting out the moral ideal, more worthy than one that
had to struggle to perfection? To this I answer in the af-
firmative but ask in return if power and knowledge cannot be
limited without a limiting of moral ideal.
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Chapter II
Rashdall's Theory — God, the Personal Ideal
Rashdall's conception is very similar to McConnell's
except that he has not laid the definite stress on Christlike-
ness. Rashdall's Theory grov/s out of his idealist assumpt-
ions and is not based on any particular person. Otherwise
the chief difference is that Rashdall permits the limitation
of God's power more than McConnell does.
Idealist As a basis for his theory of God Rashdall
Assumptions
assumes the validity of the belief that there
is no such thing as matter apart from mind. Things exist for
mind, not for themselves. The result of this position is
that there must be minds to know things. But since no single
human mind ever knows all things at any one time there must be
a Supreme Mind which we call God. "My own reason, making
inferences from my ovm experience, assures me that the world
was when I was not — when no human or sub=human ancestor of
mine was there to contemplate the molten planet or the contract-
ing nebula. I cannot understand my present experience without
making that assumption. There must then have been a conscious-
ness for which the world always existed. ... Idealism then
proves the existence of a "Universal Thinker"." ^ In his
"Philosophy of Religion" Mr. Rashdall states this same position.
"Matter cannot intelligibly be supposed to exist apart from
mind: and yet it clearly does not exist merely for our minds.
If the whole is to exist at all there must be some one mind
which knows the whole We cannot explain the world
* Sturt, Eki,, "Personal Idealism" Ch. VIII, p. 376.
(r
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without the supposition of one universal mind in which and
for which all so-called material things exist and always have
existed." *
God is Rashdall, however, refuses to think of God
Personal
as an abstract Mind beyond matter which we cannot
know. He is personal. "Just the same line of thought which
infers that God knows perfectly the world v/hich we know imper-
fectly points to the belief that he possesses perfectly the
personality which we possess imperfectly." And what are the
marks of personality? They are, according to Rashdall: con=
sciousness, thought, a degree at least of permanence or contin-
uity, ability to distinguish between the person and the objects
of his thought, and also the ability to distinguish between him-
self and other persons—the capacity for individuality, and a
person must also have the ability to will or act. But on the
basis of these distinctions personality is entirely a matter
of degree and it is hard to say just where it begins. The
simplest living organisms may possess these in degree. But if
we add another element, that of morality, to the qualities of
personality we definitely limit it. Morality, the ability to
choose and to judge on the basis of value, is certainly not
present in the lower animals and not in a very full sense in
the higher animals. In man we find moral judgments very
clearly present, but only in God does it reach perfection. For
God "wills in accordance with the conception of an ideal end
or good." *^ God cannot fully know what he has never exper-
* Rashdall, "Philosophy of Religion" Ch.VIII, p. 376.
Sturt, Ed.; "Personal Idealism." Ch. VIII, p. 576.
Ibid. p. 376.
IC
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ienced. Hence he must feel pleasure and pain; love good and
hate evil; etc, "To be a self-conscious being, conscious
of itself and other beings, thinking, willing, feeling, lov-
ing — is what we mean by a person." * God is the perfection
of imperfect human personality. "We know of no form of ulti-
mately real being except the self. ... That being which is not
for a self is a self." ^
God is In his "philosophy of Religion," Rashdall
Creator
uses the arguments of cause and effect and of
metaphysical unity to prove God's creatorship. All about us
we see cause and effect. It is very hard for us to think of
the world as coming out of nothingness without being willed or
caused. "In the consciousness of our ovm activity (v/hereby
we will a thing and the result follows) we get a direct exper-
ience of causality." Thus, as the mind which knows the
universe, God is also it's cause.
Again "If God is thought of as linked by some inexplicable
fate to a nature over which He has no sort of control ... we
cannot be said to have reduced the world to a unity." We
have thus a Wellsian situation with a world and a God neither
of which explains the other. Rashdall says that such a world
could have no purpose or rational end.
But Rashdall 's real argument for God as Creator is based
on his idealistic premise. On this basis he says "it will
hardly be questioned that, if God wills, he must will all, or
at least everything that is not willed by some lesser will ...
* Rashdall, "Philosophy of Religion." p. 55.
** Sturt, Op. Cit. Ch. VIII, p. 388.
Rashdall, "Philosophy of Religion." p. 41.
^-J-c** Ibid, p. 31.
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God must will the object of his own thought i.e. the
world," * For surely, if the world does not exist apart from
the mind which thinks it we must postulate that that mind also
wills it. This is particularly true if we agree with Rashdall
that thought without willing is an unthinkable abstraction,
God is both Reason and Will, therefore God is Creator,
God is Creator, ho?/ever, of more than the physical uni-
verse. Logic and the demand for unity also lead to the con-
clusion that human minds are derived from this Supreme Mind,
If this were not so the terms "Supreme Mind" and "All-Knower"
would be farcical. But human minds are limited by the matter
of which they are not creators and God the Creator is not thus
limited.
However, once He has created it, human self-consciousness
is separate from God. However well I may knov/ another person
even in his inner life, he is always distinct from me. There
is always a distinction between my experience and my knowledge
of another's experience, God, who created us, must have an
infinitely profound er knowledge of us than we have of each other,
but still God and other selves are not identical.
God is This God who is Creator is not on that account
Limited
unlimited. He is limited by his power, and in this
limitation "lies the only solution of the problem of evil which
does not either destroy the goodness of God or destroy moral
distinctions altogether." As man is limited by his power
so that he must sometimes cause pain as a means to a geater good,
so God may be limited in his power so that he cannot evolve
^ Sturt, Ed. "Personal Idealism" p. 377.
Sturt, Ed. Op. Cit. ch. VIII, p. 391,
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highly organized beings without a struggle for existence, or
train human beings in unselfishness without allowing the ex-
istence of both sin and pain. If we postulate God»s goodness
(and this we must do if He is to be a God we can worship)
and if we see Him as first cause (as the idealist position
demands) then we must limit his power. For surely an all-
powerful and good Being could have created a world where evil
was not necessary to the attainment of His ideal.
God is also limited by his own nature which is moral and
has no part in evil. The only solution for pain and sin in
th^universe is to suppose them means to a greater good. God,
in his limited power, saw no other way to create growing moral
beings than by means of pain and sin. Yet "a being who was
obliged to create a world which did not seem to him good would
be a blind force, ... not a rational Will." * Therefore this
God who is limited bylhe goodness of his own nature must have
seen the possibility of good conquering or he never would have
created the world. Having created other thinking and willing
selves, he nov/ needs their aid to bring about the victory of
the good.
God's final limitation is thus seen to be the other persons
or selves in the universe, in so far as he is not those selves.
Although he is ultimately responsible for their existence he is
not nov/ directly responsible for their acts. Hence sin and
much pain may be the result of human free will rather than of
God's will. God's good will and aim are very definitely lim-
ited by the cooperation or lack of it which he receives from
other persons who are nevertheless his creatures.
* Rashdall; Op. Cit. p. 84.
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Critical
Appraisal
Taken as a whole I have very little unfavor-
able criticism of Rashdall's theory. I stated in
l: •
) •
my introduction that the existence of God in some form was to
be presupposed, Therefoi-e we need not discuss the pros and
cons of the idealistic position as a basis for belief in God,
Any system which is not pantheistic and which makes God the
Creator must be in a degree, at least, idealistic. Mr, Rashdall
has placed one limitation upon God which would not have been
necessary according to our definition of the infinite which
we said would mean no limitation save self-limitation. On
this basis God's limitation due to his own nature would not be
a limitation of his infinity.
One weakness which I feel in Mr, Rashdall's theory is that
God is presented as imperfect in pov/er yet static, Nov/here
did he give me the impression of a God who was striving with
men to overcome the limitation which was his as well as theirs.
And to me it is here, more than in his good will or prophetic
vision that we find hope that good may eventually conquer. God
has not merely done the best which his limited power would
allow and then left it up to mankind to carry on. He is
striving with us for the victory which will be his as well as
ours.
(
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Chapter III
Reeman — Cod of the Struggle
Reeman limits God more definitely than does either Mc-
Connell or Rashdall, But he keeps God as the Life Force of
the universe and for this reason I have put him next in order
even though James's conception seems to grant more opportunity
for freedom of action to God. McConnell and Rashdall agree
that since we as individuals cannot know anything beyond our
own experiences, we must interpret God in the light of those
experiences. This is true also of Reeman and of the men virhom
we will consider later. But as we move away from the Infinite
we come more and more to a God who is not only interpreted
through human experience, but limited by the limits of humanity.
For Reeman God is limited almost as much as are men by the
universe of v/hich he is the life force.
God of the Reeman sees God as the Life Force who brought
Struggle
forth the universe "as a means to his own self-ex-
pression, self-under standing, and self-realization." * He is
not the Infinite First Cause of all things, but is "The eternal
life force that has been working from the beginning." As
the immanent life force God is revealed in the life of the uni-
verse as men are revealed in their acts. And as man's possibil-
ities are judged by man at his best and not at his worst, so God
is most truly revealed by his highest expression. God's great-
ness is not limited by the evil in the world so much as it is
magnified by the good in the world. "It is a less impressive
* Reeman—E.H,, "Do we need a new Idea of God?" p. 29,
^ Ibid. p. 50.

fact for me that the struggle of the ages has been fierce and
long than that out of it there have evolved a mind and a will
in man that are able to mark its stages and that are capable
at least of giving it some point and purpose," * (cf. Chapter
II, p. 7 of this thesis.) But even though it may be less
important than the good, evil exists, and exists glaringly. In
the face of this Reeman limits God to the struggle for right-
eousness. "Since I cannot escape the thought of God and am
compelled to believe that in the main humanity is not mistaken
in its ilea of goodness, and since I cannot believe that a God
exists who is indifferent to creation and the interests of man-
kind, I am forced to the one conclusion left, namely, that God
is actually now doing the best He can and can't do better, and
that in all the struggle His interests are asnuch at stake as
humanity's, I believe that if God could end such things as
the horror of war and destroy the world's evil to-morrow He
would, and the simple reason why He doesn't is that He can't.
I can see nothing else to believe and still keep my rationality."
VJe must moreover think of this struggle as "related to inevitable
necessities in the divine being." To say that God chose
this way when He had others to choose from because human freedom
was worth the price does not satisfy Reeman. It was necessary
to the very nature of God that free moral agents should exist .
Since there was no other way, then God's struggle to make good
victorious, becomes a glorious thing. "This means that we
shall see in the sin and v/ant and death that round us lie, not
* Ibid. p. 112.
^ Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. p. 127.
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the marks of an ancient fei11 and the penalty of primal sin,
hut the task and challenge of advancing life and a new incentive
to toil and acrifice of righteousness." *
In order to bring about His victory God needs the help of
men, the highest expressions of the universe. The God of the
struggle "fighting to win larger victories, toiling to bring
into being a larger right than the world has ever yet known . .
•
needs us and all the help we can give to the effort." This
gives a real purpose to human life. We are here not only to
save our own souls, but to help save the universe,
God not God is immanent in the world's life and not
Transcendent
in any sense external to it, according to
Reeman's view. Therefore prayers for divine help are useless.
God is in the struggle and it is the purpose of human life to
help him win that struggle, rather than to gain his aid in win-
ning "a future heaven of idleness and selfishness for ourselves." -J^-^"-^-
God has no external control at all. Instead of a monarch
ruling from a throne He is a toiler. I cannot see how, if God
is completely bound by the struggle. He is more than a serf.
VJhat possible chance has He to overcome it? Men seem to have
more freedom than God. Yet Reeman does not see this difficulty,
but sees instead a "God dying thousand deaths daily and pouring
out his life's blood unceasingly in the continuous struggle." ^--5'-5Hf
All the anguish, pain, and effort of the struggle is God's own
Ibid. p. 175.
^ Ibid. p. 175.
^"-^ Ibid. P. 179.
Ibid. P. 121.
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anguish, pain, and effort." Thus Reeman's conception
is of a God who is the eternal life-force, striving unceas-
ingly for the victory of good in the universe, and needing
man's help to bring it about.
Critical I believe one weakness in Reeman's book
Appraisal
is due to the time when it was v/ritten. He
wrote during the world war, and apparently was convinced of
the moral rightness of one side over the other. The result
is what seems to me an undue criticism of monarchical termin-
ology, and even, perhaps, an undue emphasis on the struggle.
For Reeman the glory of the struggle overcomes any moral
question raised by the problem of evil.
In his fear of monarchy Reeman has cut off all transcend-
ence from God. He has tied him to the struggle as a serf is
tied to his master's toil. Man is creator of his own acts,
but though limited by them he can yet in measure rise above
them. I cannot see why God in the struggle cannot also, in a
degree at least control it. Prayer then is of value, in seek-
ing God's aid that we may better fulfill his ends.
But in spite of what I consider his weakness, I believe
that Reeman has made a real contributioon to the idea of God
when he conceives him as an integral factor in the universe who
is striving for its perfection, and particularly when he con-
ceives of God himself as growing as he struggles.
* Ibid. p. 129.

Chapter IV
James — Pragmatic View of God.
As a backgroxmd for James' idea of God we must under-
stand his basis for belief. He says "an idea is true so
loFig as to believe it is profitable for our lives." * Thi is,
it is true in so far forth as it is profitable. "The true
is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way
of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons." ^
He says that the theory of never believing a thing until you
have proof may be good enough where it is possible. But there
are many times in life when we must at least act as though we
believed even though we do not have proof. Moral questions
cannot be decided by science. Worths have to be decided by
the heart. "If your heart does not want a world of metaphysical
reality your head v/ill never make you believe in one." But
those things which our experiences show to be good, those things
are true so far as we know truth. On this basis James makes
two statements which he calls religious affirmations: 1. "The
best things are the more eternal things." S. "We are better
off now if we believe the above to be true." -x-jhh?- We may,
therefore, expect James' idea of God to be what he considers
to be most worth while from the point of view of life as a whole,
regardless of the philosophical or metaphysical im.plications
v/hich may result. Because he is not troubled with metaphysical
* James "Pragmatism" p. 75.
** Ibid. p. 76.
James "The Will to Believe" p. 23.
Ibid. p. 25, 26.
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problems James has not given God a definite place in the
universe as creator or life force, God is there to give
strength and power to men — that is what really matters. As
a result while God may not be limited in the purely spiritual
realm He is far removed from the infinite Creator and Life-Giver.
Idea of "The drift of all the evidence we have seems
God
to me to sweep us very strongly tov/ards the belief
in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to
ourselves, be co-conscious." * All intellectuallst objections
may be done away, but the empirical evidence remains. "I my-
self believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner
personal experiences." The God so conceived cannot be
definitely described. He may be either polytheistically or
monotheistically conceived. If He is to satisfy the varying
needs of each individual a single unified character cannot be
made of Him. "The divine can mean no single quality, it must
mean a group of qualities, by being champions of which in alter-
nation, different men may all find worthy missions. Each
attitude being a syllable in human nature's total message, it
takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely."
"As long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we
deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal
with private and personal phenomena as such, wel^dal with
realities in the completest sense of the term." "^^-^^^ Therefore
* Kallen - "Philosophy of Wm. James" p. 217.
^ James "The Will to Believe" p. 109,
James "Varieties of Religious Experience p. 487.
Ibid. p. 498.
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James casts off transcendental philosophies v/hich make God
the Creator who has set things going and now blandly watches
his world work according to schedule. "Whatever sort of a
being God may be, we know today that he is nevermore that mere
external inventor of "contrivances" intended to make manifest
the "glory" in which our grandfathers took such satisfaction." *
The absolute can have no transactions with individuals, but
onJ.y with the whole. But for James this is no sort of a God.
God must be interested in things here and now.
There is more life in our total soul than we are at any
one time aware of.
,
It is this "more" which James uses as the
beginning of his belief in God. "Let me propose, as an hypo-
thesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side, the "more"
with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected
is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our
conscious life. ... It is one of the peculiarities of invasions
from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances
and to suggest to the subject an external control. .. Since, on
our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own
hidden mind v/hich are controlling, the sense of union with the
pov/er beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently,
but literally true." ^ Thus far God would appear to be only
a larger self whose objectivity is only in o;ir own minds, and
is there because we cannot comprehend the full meaning of our
own subconscious minds. But God has also another side which
* Op. Cit. p. 74.
** Ibid. p. 512-51S.
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we know through experience and which logic cannot explain.
When we commune with this unseen God, "work is actually done
upon our finite personality for we are turned into nevv- men,
and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural
world upon our regenerative change. But that which produces
effects within another reality must be termed as a reality
itself. God is real since he produces real effects. God's
existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be
permanently preserved. This v/orld may indeed, as science
assured us, some day burn up or freeze; but if it is part of
his order the old ileals are sure to be brought elsev/here to
fruition, so that v/here God is, tragedy is only provisional
and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution are not the absolute-
ly final things." * Thus from a God who starts with our own
"extra-marginal self" James grows to a conception of God as
"world ruler." "This is a very considerable over-belief.,..
Most of us pretend in some way to prop it upon our philosophy,
but the philosophy itself is really propped upon this faith." ^
"What the more characteristically divine facts are, apart
from the actual inflow of energy in the faith — state and the
prayer — state, I know not. But the over-belief on which
I am ready to make my personal venture is that they exist. The
whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world
of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of
consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must
contain experiences which have meaning for our life also; and
* Op. Cit. p. 516-517.
** Ibid. p. 518.

that although in the main their experiences and those of
this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at
certain points, and the higher energies filter in. By being
faithful in my poor measure to this over-belief, I seem to
myself to keep more same and true."-^ "The believer is con-
tinuous, to his own consciousness at any rate, with a v/ider
self from which saving experiences flow in. Those who have
such experiences distinctly enough and often enough to live
in the light of them remain quite unmoved by criticism, from
whatever quarter it may come, be it academic or scientific,
or be it merely the voice of logical common sense. They
have had their vision and they knovf — that is enough —> that
we inhabit an invisible spiritual environment from which help
comes, our soul being mysteriously one with a larger soul
whose instruments we are," Belief in God becomes a matter
of faith based upon personal experience,
God and We will now consider more concretely certain
the
Absolute particulars of James' conception. First of all,
he is very certain that God is not the Absolute, If we ac-
cept the Absolute, says James, we have to admit that every-
thing is as He would have it. All is well for Him and his
eternal way of thinking. But such a theory leaves finite be-
ings to work out our ovm salvation, for all is surely not
right for our finite standards. If we are to have a God at
all his services "are needed in the dust of our human trials
even more that his dignity is needed in the empyrean."
^ Op. Cit. p, 519.
James "A pluralistic Universe." p. 308.
*^ James "Pragmatism" p. 72.
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The logical corollary to absolutism is determinism which leads
to individual indifferent ism. The world v/ill be saved « Why,
then should we as individuals worry about it. But if we have
many forces at work we have no assurance of salvation save as
our united efforts bring it about. In absolutism there is one
All-Knower. But under pliu-alism there are many knov/ers and
the greatest knower of all may not yet know the v^hole of every-
thing, or may not know what he does know at a single stroke.
This theory not only limits God»s knowledge, but also his pov/er.
Yet it saves his morality and James agrees with McConnell that
that must be the fundamental quality of God. "The only way
to escape from, the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistent-
ly thoughtout and monistic universe suffers from the problem
of evil in short — is to be frankly pluralistic and assume
that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, has
itself an external environment, and conseQ_uently is finite." ^
God is finite either in power or in knowledge or in both at
once. "Beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him
there exists a larger pov;er which is friendly to him and to his
ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be
both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything
larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the
next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary.
It might conceivably be only a larger and more godlike self of
which the present self would then be but the mutilated express-
* Op. City. "Pluralistic Universe" p, 310-11.
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ion, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of
such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness with no
absolute unity realized in it at all." * A pluralistic con-
ception of some sort is necessary to meet the pragmatic con-
ception of truth, for only with the idea of the Many rather
than the One does the right action on the part of individuals
really matter. If God is not absolute, right action on the
part of individuals can and does effect the progress of the
universe. Moreover, according to the pluralistic belief "who
knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to
their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn
to be more effectively faithful to his 07m greater tasks?"
God and Belief in a finite God leads inevitably to
Free Will
belief in free will. A belief in determinism lends
stability to the world. We know then that whatever happens
should be so and even though we cannot mder stand we believe
that eventually all will be right. Belief in free will does
av/ay with this peace but it adds to individual dignity and im-
portance. But the real value of free will is that it means
"novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its deep-
est elements, as well as in its surface phenomena, the future
may not identically repeat and imitate the past... it holds up
improvement as at least possible." To me this leads to a
greater ideal of God than does McConnell's idea that God chose
the present universe with its lav/s as the best possible way to
make and save men. I agree with James that "V/e can with dif-
ficulty comprehend the character of a cosmic mind v/hose purposes
* Op, Cit. "varieties of Religious Experience" p. 5S5.
^ Ibid p, 159.
^-•5^ James "Pragmatism" p. 119.
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are fully revealed by the strange mixture of goods and evils
that we find in this actual world's particulars." ^ It seems
a strange God who would plan an eruption of Vesuvius as part
of his cfesign.
God more "The notion of God...has this practical
than Matter
superiority over (the ideas of mechanical
philosophy), it guarantees an ideal order that shall be perman-
ently preserved." ^ Material things may perish but God is
bound to bring ideals to fruition somev/here, somehow, for
ideals are the most worthwhile things we know. "Materialism
means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and
the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirm-
ation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope." *^
On such a definition spiritualism and not materialism meets the
pragmatic test of truth. "Give us a matter that promises
success, that is bound by its laws to lead our world ever nearer
to perfection, and any rational man v/ill v/orship that matter." -^hhh$-
Critical James definitely states that God is not
Appraisal of
James. the sort of Creator who has made a universe,
wouM it up and left it to run. There is nothing to lead me
to believe that James thinks of God as Creator at all. Yet his
God is very definitely more than Collective Mind as we shall
find Reese interpreting that conception. Although James finds
the "hither side of God in our subconscious selves the "farther"
side as expressed in his "over-belief" is surely much more.
Op. Cit. "Pragmatism" p. 113.
Ibid. p. 106.
Ibid. p. 107.
Ibid. p. 102.

His approach to God, and his experience of what God can
mean to individual lives, I find to be essentially my own.
But unless God he Creator or collective mind I cannot grasp
his connection with the universe. To be sure James does
not state as Wells does that "God comes we know not whence."
I am inclined to believe that James would agree with Alexander
that God is the next step. "Anything larger will do, if only
it be large enough to trust for the next step." ^ I disagree
with James as to what is "large enough to trust for the next
step." The God in whom I trust must be an objective reality
more than my enlarged self. He must be as real as any other
person but must have a power over the universe which only a
free creator could have. His power and knowledge may both be
limited, but I cannot believe that free personalities, whether
human or superhuman grow out of an impersonal universe. If God
is ultimate then he must be creator. I do not find such a
belief expressed or implied in James's theory. He seems entire-
ly untroubled by metaphysical problems.
Op. Cit, p. 107.
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Chapter V
Schiller — Humanist Conception of God
Schiller is an admirer of, and in some respects a
% follower of, James, but he calls his philosophy "humanism"
rather than "pragmatism." Humanism he defines as "the
philosophic attitude which, without wasting thought upon
attempts to construct experience a priori, is content to take
human experience as the clue to the world of human experience."-^
On the basis of human experience Schiller believes in a force
apparently apart from the individual v,hich influences individual
behavior. Yet experience does not point to the existence of
this force apart from our knowing of it. This force which
we call God affects individual minds and is affected by them,
yet does not have meaning except as it is knovm by those minds.
Here we have a limited God indeed; one who is limited by the
universe to be sure; and more, one who is not an objective
reality.
Idea of Schiller has no use for the Absolute. Even
Reality
though it existed it could have no value for us,
p so why believe in it? He says the Absolute is "the death of
morals. The idea of the Absolute v/hole cannot be rendered
compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital
atmosphere of human agents. ... In the Absolute all moral dis-
^ tinctions, must, like all others, be swallowed up and dis-
appear." •»^(c.f. James, p. 37 of this thesis) As experience
is the basis for judging truth it must also be the means of
* Schiller, F.C.S. "Humanism" p. XIX
Schiller Op. Git. pp. 2-3.
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finding reality. The real has meaning for us only as we
know it or experience it and we cannot experience the absolute.
What it is like apart from our knowing of it we cannot even
speculate, "We must discard the notion that ... Reality is
what it is whatever we may do. It is true on the contrary
that our action is essential and indispensable, that to some
extent the world (our world) is of our making, and that without
us nothing is made that is made." * "We come in contact with
reality only in the act of knowing or experiencing it. As un-
knowable, therefore, the Real is nil, as unlmown it is only
potentially real. The situation therefore in no wise sanctions
the assumption that what the Real is in the act of knowing, it
is also outside that relation. .. When the mind knows reality
both are affected. ... I can see no reason why the view that
reality exhibits a rigid nature unaffected by our treatment,
should be deemed theoretically more justifiable than its con-
verse, that it is utterly plastic to our every demand. ... The
actual situation is, of course, a case of interaction, a pro-
cess of cognition in which the "subject" and "object" determine
each other, and both "we" and "reality" are involved."
Therefore, although Reality is meaningless apart from human
knowing of it, and though it is affected by human knowledge,
it is somehow distinct from that knowledge. But this possible
unknown Reality has no value for us. "The fact is that the
conception of ultimate reality looks forward and not back....
We can conceive ourselves as getting an answer about the begin-
* Schiller "Studies in Humanism" p. 12.
Schiller Op. Cit. p. 11.
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ning of the world process onlj at the end. And it will be
no 7/onder if by that time we should have grovm too wise and
too well satisfied to v/ant to raise the question." It is
what reality means to our lives here and now that really
matters.
The idea of Reality as God comes in answer to the demand
for "something to respond to the outcry of the human heart."
The idea of God means "(a) a human moral principle of Help and
Justice; and (b) an aid to the intellectual comprehension of
the universe." Among the agents of creation "there may be
a being (or perhaps mre than one) so vastly more important than
ourselves that his part in the shaping of reality may have been
so preponderant as almost to warrant our hailing him as "Creator . "-"<-5hh{-
But having magnanimously admitted this for any who wish so to
believe Schiller states as his ov/n belief that "The way to
satisfy v/hat is legitimate in the demand (for God) is, not by
conceiving an original fact, but by conceiving a final satis-
faction." ^-HHH^*
The real meaning of God for Schiller is that he is the
"unity of the universe." -J^^-^JH?- Each individual sees this
reality in different terms, "as what he has it in him to per-
ceive, and variously transfigures what, v/ithout his vision were
an unseen void." -5H'r-)HHHH?- Individuality is a varying and a
growing quantity which is never fully developed. But it is
much more real than any abstract universal which we may set up.
Therefore the real must be thought of in terms of individual-
* Ibid. p. 436.
^ Ibid. p. 136,
Ibid. p. 286.
Ibid. p. 447.
^^Ar-Yr¥r Ihld . p. 437.
*^-x-x-^* Schiller: "Problems of Belief" p. 145.
-;;-4HHHHH(- Schiller: "Humanism" d. 16.
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ity, and "We must learn to think of the individuality of
the real,... not as completed being, but as a becoming, i.e.
as being a process." ^ The belief that reality is a process
and not static, plus the belief that it is reshaped by our
knowledge and acts result in an ethical situation with a pros-
pect of betterment. The salvation of the ;vorld depends upon
the striving of individuals.
Critical God as "the unity of the universe" seems
Appraisal
at first glance to be related to Alexander's
conception that "God is the universe with a nisus tov/ard deity."
But upon closer examination a great difference is seen. For
Schiller the unity is no more than that which somehow unites
the knoxvledge of individuals so that knov/ledge can be shared,
but for Alexander God is an objective ideal to which we are al-
ways striving.
As we have seen, Schiller speaks of both "we" and "reality,"
but if reality does not exist apart from our knowing of it I
cannot see how it is as real as the knowers. In common with the
others whom we have studied, Schiller insists upon the moral
-quality of reality. But according to his definition of
Reality, its morality I should think would be as varied as that
of individuals. There is here nothing "to respond to the out-
cry of the human heart", and I am ready to agree with Wells in
at least this one point, that in the individual good will we
have no assurance of permanent good. Of course, v/e as individ-
uals cannot grasp a moral order beyond our present experience,
so that our present standards cannot be held to be ultimate.
* Ibid. p. 124
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But if a good God exists whom I can know more and more fully
as I discover his likeness, there is a real source of help
and an inspiration to bring his way to pass — to bring in
the "kingdom." Whereas a God who is shaped by my acts may
be an interesting piece of creativity, but is not a real help.
i
Chapter VI
Reese — Humanist Conception of God.
Although he calls his philosophy "Humanism", Reese's
idea is very different from Schiller *3. Schiller says that
apart from human knowing of it. Reality is meaningless, but
he is not ready to say that it cannot be an objective reality.
And he feels the need of "something to respond to the outcry
of the human heart." Reese, hov^ever, sees no need of any-
thing beyond man's ideal of the fullest development of himself
and the race. Since he does not really accept a belief in
God, he really has no place in this thesis, but I have included
him to illustrate how far the limitation of God can be
carried without being classed as completely atheistic.
Reese — Reese states with great assurance that
God not
Necessary science has found the universe to be a self-oper-
ating system. It finds ordinary cosmic events and processes,
routine and impersonal, and other things cared for by highly
specialized parts of nature such as man. It regards order and
purpose as self existent. With such a foundation for belief
there is no place for God. "Religion symbolizes the human
quest to discover in the natiire of man and the universe the
kind of life that is inherently desirable, and to enlist in
its behalf all instrumentalities, both human and cosmic that
are capable of assisting in its realization." ^ There is no
basis in this modern religion for faith in and response to the
super-human; it is based on the complete and permanent satis-
factions of human life. "Liberalism is building a religion
^ Reese; "Humanism" pp. 21-22.
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that would not be shaken even if God were outgrown." * The
liberal recognizes that purposive and powerful cosmic processes
are operative and that man is increasingly able to co-operate
with them and in a measure control them, Reese says that
some may call these processes God, but he is v/illing to leave
off the label, "The abiding spiritual reality is human
worthfulness •" ** As a natural result of such a belief he
says that "The principal agent in the remaking of a human being
is his own will," ***
Morality is fundamental even in this philosophy. "The
object of humanistic religion is the enhancement of the human
estate. The chief end of man is to build towering personality
and to direct it into y/ays of complete living.
"Worthy living, unconquerable loyalty to noble purposes,
sympathy unrimmed by class or creed or race — these are the
pillars and the pinacle of religion." The interesting,
and to me strange, part of this theory is that the attainment
of such an ideal is to be realized only through the freedom
of mankind from super-orders, God included. "Thus far there
is not a shred of competent evidence in regard to the nature
and purpose of ultimate reality." -JHWHHt Since he has no proof
of anything higher Reese has left the human mind as the sole
spiritual reality. This is a finite God indeed.
Ibid, p. 62.
^ Ibid. p. 63.
Ibid, p. 50.
Ibid. p. 17-20.
^-^yHh Ibid. p. 4.

Critical Reese considers "human worthfulness"
Appraisal
the "abiding spiritual reality." But since
man also has many evil qualities what is to help him to over-
come these if there is no power beyond himself? Even
Schiller admits of a Reality which shapes us even as v/e shape
it, but Reese professes complete ignorance of any reality
beyond the human mind. If such reality there be, it means
nothing to him. My answer to this is based on his own argu-
ments for the validity of experience, as well as on my belief
in what makes a coherent philosophy, J know in my own life
that a spiritual reality other than myself functions. And
my reason tells me that a world such as we have with human
minds included, is not a mere happenstance of an impersonal
order. Science does not prove to me that the universe is a
self-operating system. Reese may be logical if we grant his
starting point, an impersonal order. I disagree v/ith this.
But even though science told me that the universe v/as imper-
sonal I would know that it is n6t, just as i^e know that God is
good even in the face of evil in the world.
r
Chapter VII
H. G. Wells — God, the Invisible King
Without labeling his method pragmatic. Wells has, never-
theless, worked out his theory along the lines which have the
most practical meaning for him. He has not follov/ed any
definite philosophical system and, therefore, he is hard to
label. As the attempts of one individual, and a keen-minded
one at that, to work out a religious system which he believes
could be universal, it is worth notice.
Idea of In his introduction to "God the Invisible King
God
Mr. Wells states his idea of God to be "Complete
agnosticism in the matter of God the Creator and entire faith
in the matter of God the Redeemer,"* He may not know much
more than we do of the ways and means of Creation for he had
nothing to do with it. "He comes, we know not whence into the
conflict of life. .. He has begun and he will never cease."
God is no more the Life Force than he is a creator. The
Life Force is responsible for the ugly and the lovely, the harm
ful and the good in life. God is not responsible for either,
but he utilizes the lovely and the good in man.
This God, who "comes we know not whence" is a person. Man
knows this by experience, by the absolute certainty that one is
not alone in oneself. "It is as if one was touched at every
point by a being akin to oneself, sympathetic, beyond measure
* Wells, H.G.; "God the Invisible King" p. XII.
** Op. Cit. p. 18.
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wiser, steadfast, and pure in aim. It is completer and more
intimate, but it is like standing side by side with and touch-
ing someone that we love very dearly and trust completely. It
is as if this being bridged a thousand misunderstandings and
brought us into fellowship with a great multitude of other
people."* As a person God is of the nature of thought and
will. He has not a material body. "V/ith our eyes he looks
out upon the universe he invades; with our hands he lays hands
upon it. ... He is the undying human memory, the increasing
human will." Yet God does not thus become Collective Mind
he is a being in himself and is more than what human beings
contribute to him, just as man is more than the sum of the
cells in his body or as England is more than her land. "And
so we think of God as synthetic reality, though he has neither
body nor material parts. And so too, we may obey him and
listen to him, though we thin^ but lightly of the men whose
hands or voices he sometimes uses. And we may think of him
as having moods and aspects as a man has — and a consistency
we call his character."
But the personal God of Mr. Wells is not nearly so clear-
ly defined a person as is the God interpreted by McConnell or
Rashdall. He has tried to make him objective but I am not
sure that his "synthetic reality" is personal at all. God not
only is not Creator or Life Force, but neither does he seem to
* Op. Cit, p. 232.
Op. Cit. p. 61.
Op. Cit. p. 65.
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be a creature. He is a "unique existence which Mr« V«^ells
says is a person. But how God can be an objective fact, a
person in the universe, yet not have a definite relationship
to it is hard for me to understand. For Mr. Wells* God has
the character and attributes of a person, but has not the
power of individual action. Men are the channels through
which he works. According to Webster a person is the "spon-
taneous energy of thought evolving itself in products." I
doubt if Mr. VJells' God fulfills the latter part of this defin-
ition.
As a person Mr. Wells gives God the characteristics of
courage; youth, as symbolised by growth, the forward look; and
love as an exaltation out of self, a complete and generous fel-
lowship. God needs man to bring in his kingdom as a captain
needs his men to attain a victory. As a captain is nothing
without his company so God is nothing without mankind.
Though he does not exist in matter or space, God exists in
time just as thought may do. Somev;here in the dav/ning of man=
virjd he had a beginning, an awakening, and as m-ankind grows he
grows. This growing God increases in moral power as man does.
"God v/ho is himself finite, v/ho himself struggles in his great
effort from strength to strength has no spite against error." ^-
But he helps mankind to overcome evil. (Can Mr. Wells thus
easily do away v/ith any problem of evil and its overcoming?)
God is so limited that he does not even fully apprehend the
end toward which he is aiming. As time goes on he will ap-
prehend it more fully. At present he seejss his aim as the
* Op. Cit. p. 24.
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overcoming of death or evil. For more knowledge and power
God ... "must use human eyes and hands and brains." "5^" This
idea may stimulate the need for man's moral activity, but I
fail to see it as a truly personal ideal of God.
Why have As Mr. Wells tells us why to believe in
a God
God he isnore of a religionist than a philosopher,
I believe. There are benevolent atheists v^ho believe that in
noan there is a "good-will" v^hich causes him to live individually
and socially on a high level. Since he lives in society he
finds it better if he is thoughtful of and helpful towards others.
VThy, if the very conditions of life bring him to such an atti-
tude, does he need a God? Mr. Wells has his ansv/er ready. The
man suggested stands alone ^upon his own good will, without a
reference, without a standard, trusting to his own impulse to
goodness, relying upon his own moral strength." It ma.y be
that there is a certain clory in this ideal of personal nobil-
ity; but Mr. Wells suggests that it smacks even more of priggish-
ness. The 7/orld as we know it is full of temptations to anti-
social conduct as well as to this fine social relationship. If
a man's goodness depends only on his inner good-v/ill there is
a great cfenger that he may fall. He not only has no God, but
no living link vrith other men of good-Yvill. The man vvho be--
lieves in God, on the other hand, has completely turned av/ay
from self and derives his assurance from God who also unites
him with other men v/orking for the same ideal.
* Op. Cit, p. 99.
^ Wells, E.G.; "God the Invisible King", p. 83.
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"This goodness that I thought was within me and of rnyself,
and upon which I rather prided myself, is without me, and
above myself, and infinitely greater and stronger than I. It
is the immortal and I am mortal. ... I have come under a
divine imperative, I am obeying an irresistible call, I am a
humble and willing servant of the righteousness of God."^- But
God does not only furnish this "divine imperative"; he responds
to our need and gives us power to overcome o\xc weakness. He
is an active factor.
How to Mr# Wells does not seek to present logical
find God
or rational proof for his God. He says there
are men who are constantly seeking God by logic. They sit at
desks away from life v/ith its practical need for God and rack
their brains to find a proof for him or to meet objections to
him. "They weave spider-like webs of muddle and disputation
across the path by which men come to God." But, "If you
do not feel God then there is no persuading you of him." -5^**
First one must feel the need of God and then form or receive
an adeq^uate and acceptable idea of him. If we search within
for God presently we shall find him and know that he is real.
The sense of God is the attainment of an absolute certainty
j»hat one is not alone in oneself. After this experience
one's life is changed. One is assured that there is a pov/er
that fights with him against the confusion and evil within and
v/ithcut. All of the arguments in the world can neither* In-
* Op. Cit. pp. 84-85.
^ Op. Cit. p. 29.
Ibid. p. 98.
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crease nor lessen this assurance. This may not be of any
use to a skeptic, but it is the only way to God which Mr. Wells
offers.
God, the Once we have truly experienced God we must
Invisible King
take him into our daily living; we must be
changed beings. God is the Invisible King whose goodness must
be expressed in every phase of our daily living. "There is no
act altogether without significance, no power so humble that
it may not be used for or against God, no life but can orient
itself to him.^ * Acceptance of God is not a mere intellect-
ual or emotional decision; it must mean a conversion of life
so that the complete life is turned to God's way. It means an
incessant watching of one's self. One who is God's must be free
of prejudice, carefully truthful, a v/orker, not a drone, clean
and clear-minded. "These are daily fundamental duties that
everyone who comes to God will, as a matter of course, set be-
fore himself." -k-* Moreover, in giving myself to God, I become,
in a measure, responsible for all the evil in the world. I
become my brother's keeper and the final victory of good is
partly dependent on me. These things must be true of God's
followers because they are true of God.
Though one is thus changed by knowing God, he cannot infer
that God's way is a cut and dried one. God himself is not sure
in advance of every step of the way. His ideal is the overcom-
ing of death in all of its forms. The death of progress due to
^- Op. Clt. p. 101.
Op. Cit. p. 107.
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prejudice, hatred, and fear is as great a danger as the death
of the race and is just as Important to overcome. Thus the
great aim appears to be the cono^uest of death that victorious
living may go on. How this is to be accomplished God !^noT/s
very little, if any, better than we do. Hov/ever, Mr, Wells
is convinced that this conquest comes, not through suffering,
yielding, submission, but through fighting. Jesus on the
cross is a saint of non-reiistance, but not the ideal. "We of
the new faith repudiate non-resistance. We are the militant
followers of a militant God. ... Submission is the remotest
quality of all from our God." ^- Thus the followers of God are
to be completely free from prejudice and superstition, yet mil-
itant,
God is Mr. Wells has set forth his ideal not merely
Universal
as his ovm philosophy, but as a basis for religious
unification whereby all may come to God. To the mass of men
he says "This is the God it has always been in your nature to
apprehend." Many are so steeped in super stiiitions, fears,
or creeds that they seem to have shut themselves off from the
light. But we must remember that religion is not essentially
mental and therefore all may have at least some glimpse of the
truth of God.
Critical Appraisal For me, Mr. Wells has at times reached
of
Above Theory religious heights, but at other times he
seems to have lowered the ideal to the level of our present under-
standing. There are also times when I G_uestion the soundness
^ Od. Cit. p. 103.
^ Op. Cit. p. 137.
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of his reasoning. I can \inder stand lir. Wells^ belie-^e^ in a
moral God who thinks and wills the good, and who v/ith greater
wisdom strength and love than man has, helps us onward. My
experience assures me of this as Mr, Wells does. To me the
wealmess of lir. Wells's system is in his failure to make God
a necessary part of the universe. He came into it, we know not
whence, when, nor how. Why then can we suppose that he is as
vitally interested as the theory proposes in the growth to per-
fection of this thing with which he has no vital connection?
That a God v/ho is v/orking out his own salvation through his im-
perfect creation shbuld care deeply for its best welfare I can
understand. But I do not see how Mp. Wells can feel such as-
surance that this being would care so deeply for a creation for-
eign to himself. It seems to me that such a God v^ould be like
Mathew Arnold's earth maiden who married a merman. But her earth
world called, and though she loved her adopted people of the sea
the ties of kinship v/ere stronger and she returned to it "leaving
lonely forever the kings of the sea." Would not a God who has
no inherent relation to the universe or to life be apt to be
as faithless as the maiden? How does Mr. Wells know that God
will never return whence he came? I can see no coherence, no
real basis for faith in such an erratic being, neither creator
nor creature of this universe. Humanism with its God of the
social mind seems to me a more reasonable foundation for my faith
than the one here .given.
Also, I cannot see v^hy God's wisdom should be so limited
that he does not even fully understand his own end. I can see
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
LIBRARY

how his power is limited and his Imowledge of v/hat man's co-
operation will he. But he may have a very clear ideal even
though he does not -understand just how it is to be brought about.
Again I object to his concept of a militant God, Mr. V^fells
is a historian. Does not his history show him that in the long
run it is not the militant, but the outwardly yielding, forces
which have conquered spiritually? Early Christianity was not
militant and it conquered by its spiritual force. It was v/hen
it became militant that it lost its spiritual glory and chose
asceticism as the only means of regaining God, Throughout
history the Chinese, in yielding to their military conquerors
have conquered them culturally and spiritually, Mr. Wells
says "A Christianity which shows for its daily symbol, Christ
risen and trampling victoriously upon a broken cross would be
far more in the spirit of our worship." * Does not "Christ
risen" imply Christ crucified? The living Christ is glorious
because he overcame by spiritual power the death which militant
force led him to.
* Op. Cit. p. 103
c£
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CONCLUSION
Summary In the preceding study we have found several
solutions to the problem of God. We have seen the idea of the
Infinite Creator made finite so that God is limited by his crea-
tion, particularly by human free-will; so that he is limited by
his power which is not infinite; and so that he is limited in
creation to the life force of the universe, and is consequently
committed to st ruggle. We have also seen the conception of the
Infinite Ideal made finite so that God is interpreted in terms
of the highest meaning to human life here and nov;; or is even so
limited that he becomes no more than the human ideal. And, fin=
ally, we have discussed an idea of God which seems totally un-
related to the universe, yet which, in the mind of its creator,
is objectively real.
Reese appears to be more concerned with glorifying man,
than with the character of spiritual reality. But in every
other case the limitation of God has grown out of the desire to
preserve God's morality. If we are to believe in a God at all
he must be good. This is the refrain of every theory. But
each man takes a different way to explain the apparent paradox
of a good God with the facts of the universe as we see them.
McConnell accounts for sin on the basis of human free-will,
and answers the problem of evil in the physical realm only by
a faith that God knows why he chose this way. His solution is
practically the same as Joyce's. Rashdall limits God's povv-er
and believes that God chose the only way possible for him. This
cc
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of course, brings up the question of what could limit a creator
1
God»s choice, but puzzles Rashdall less than any other way of
€LECounting for evil doejfs. Reeman finds God struggling to
^ overcome evil, and needing human efforts to insure his victory,
James, Schiller, and Wells each in his own way, do away v/ith
God as Creator and by a pluralism more definite than that of
the previous men, relieve God of responsibility for evil, al-
though they will admit his ofesire to overcome or to help men
to overcome evil.
My Personal Since the doctors disagree I have decided
Belief
to mix my own prescription. . Reese, and even
Schiller have too little beyond the human to be of any aid to
me, for my logic and experience both tell me that there is more.
Wells I disregard for myself because he sounds too much like
a quack. His prescription is supposed to be a universal rem-
edy, but it has no sound basis. For me God must have some con-
nection with this universe if he is to exist at all. But though
I have prepared a prescription Vv^hich I am willing to live by for
the present, I do not guarantee that it is permanent.
In the first place I am willing to accept with James the
pragmatic basis for judging truth, and to believe that idea of
God which has the most worth for my life. But my reason also
enters in and says ihat a theory v/ithout any logical basis is
^ not worthful. I believe in God as personal because I have ex-
perienced his strength and helpfulness in my ovm life, and also
f
with McConnell, because I cannot account for the personality
in the universe if God be impersonal. I believe in God as good
because my whole being rebels at anything else, and because I
cannot account for the presence of good otherwise. I accept
good as the essential and evil as the accident in the universe
because good is of more worth.
I believe that God is creator and is still creating; is
immanent and yet transcendent. McConnell says that a moral God
must have faced the consec[uences of his act and still he be-
lieves that God deliberately chose our present universe as the
best way. I would rather limit God's freedom as Reeman does
ajQd say that creation wgs a necessity of God's nature and this
growing universe is the result of God's best efforts which are
still being put forth. I believe that God is creator because
any other sort of objective God seems to me a freak in the uni-
verse. The God who answers my need must be large enough, not
onJ-y for the next step, but to give some assurance of perman-
ent helpfulness. God did not create a machine which he has
now left rimning. He began a creative process which he has
been seeking to perfect ever since. I believe that he isMDre
than the power behind a machine; he is also the personal
director. I do not believe that God is more limited than his
free agents, and if we can direct and control nature to our
ends I believe that God can do likewise. I firmly believe
that if an individual constantly seeks through knowledge and
prayer to find God's way and to do it, that God gives extra-
ordinary pcwer and insight to that individual. Perhaps this
€C
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means, as Reeman believes, that God's creativity is limited
to the Life-Force of the Universe rather than that he is ulti-
mate First Cause. But I do not believe with Reeman that God
is limited to the struggle. If he is the Life-Force God is
the struggle, but he can also rise above it. I believe
God can bring about new conditions without breaking laws to do
^ ^ ±z , Because I believe in God's ability to do things I believe
in prayer which increases the possibility of cooperation be-
tween God and man and opens new doors for God's activity.
Having admitted God's limitation of power at the start I
must add the belief that he is growing. Thus any victory of
good becomes God's victory drawing him that much nearer to his
ideal. But I do not see that limitation in God's power limits
his goodness. His choice has ne^^er been for the lop/er, but
his limited power has made it impossible to bring moral beings
into existence without a struggle.
Finally, I believe that in Jesus we see the human ideal.
In his spirit I see the character of God revealed and I see
what a God-filled life can really be. In Jesus I see the
finest expression of God's creatorship. If God could develop
the Christ from one life yielded completely to his way I have
faith that he can do it again in other lives so yielded, and I
believe it is to such ai end that he is striving.
I.
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